Part 1 of 2. This is the basic plan for converting a healthy public corporation. It is relatively straightforward, offers free choice, but can overpay by not taking full advantage of natural finance principles to bypass the market corruption caused by the price difference between buying 100 shares vs 10M shares.
copied from manifesto.
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Converting a public corporation is voluntary by all affected stakeholders. It can be complete, partial, done in stages, and convert bonds, preferred and common shares. Once natural finance conversion has begun, no new bonds or preferred shares can be issued, and common share issues are not recommended..
copied from manifesto.
____________________________________________________________
Converting a public corporation is voluntary by all affected stakeholders. It can be complete, partial, done in stages, and convert bonds, preferred and common shares. Once natural finance conversion has begun, no new bonds or preferred shares can be issued, and common share issues are not recommended..
Bondholders
should be given first priority to convert. Secured QCSLs most
closely fit the bonds the company considers too expensive for it. If
all bondholders converted to unsecured QCSLs, they would all have
enhanced security (demand lower yield) by the fact that they are
first in line to be paid. Unsecured QCSL conversion for bondholders
is essentially a cash redemption of bonds which is sometimes an
enterprise right attached to some bonds. Secured QCSLs also offer
better security to converting bondholders because in a distressed
bankruptcy type scenario, they get theoretically 100% of principal,
and they also receive high yields including a non taxable
depreciation coupon. Those bondholders that do not convert, continue
to have a fixed obligation paid before QCSLs, including principal at
maturity, but they lose relative priority in the event of bankruptcy.
A net positive to convert. Even when converting to natural
financing in a distressed enterprise situation, if the conversion
buys a few years survival, bondholders are substantially incentivized
to convert. Better value to bondholders through natural finance,
means lower borrowing costs to the enterprise.
Preferred
shareholders are the only
group that are economically-forced to convert in order to keep their
relative security and payment regularity. Secured QCSLs match the
payment regularity most closely. Non maturing Preferred shares are
in fact a scam on its buyers, because the principal is never repaid.
The odds that a non-liquor company will eventually (or within 200
years) go bankrupt are over 99.9%. Preferred shares tend not to have
sufficient premium over bonds to understand that risk as properly
considered. From the enterprise's perspective, paying a pre-profit
coupon inflated by the inverse of its untaxed profit rate is
equivalent to a preferred coupon. For example, at a 25% tax rate an
8% bond coupon is equivalent after tax to a 6% preferred share coupon
(for same maturity date). From the investor perspective, forcing the
exchange is forcing a net benefit of additional bond security, and forcing a net benefit is a gift. In
most countries, on average, there is an equivalent after tax return
to the securities as well. Offering the same optional conversion
options to (converted) bondholders after the exchange, provides the
same optional choice to preferred shareholders.
Common shares
can be converted by either an internal “takeover” bid by
management, a partial substantial issuer bid (bid for up to x
shares). A company with net assets of 500K, making 100K per year,
10000 shares outstanding, and P/E of 10 has a $100 share price. If
half the shares are sold in exchange for QCSLs loans at 10%, then
after 8 years (QCSLs are repaid), without any operational improvement
by the company, net assets are back to 500K, and the 5000 shares
remaining at a P/E of 10 are worth $200. Every rational person who
doesn't have direct oversight of management, and therefore cannot
vouch for its confidence, would prefer to hold QCSLs (ignoring tax
differences) because they are paid faster and more certainly even if
the return is the same. From the enterprise perspective, if it can
pay less than 10% interest rate (almost certain given profile), then
it is net positive to the enterprise and remaining shareholders.
Most successful public corporations should be able to achieve natural
rates close to “riskless” government bonds (under 5%-6%).
Pensions
are a scam/motivational technique on employees designed to keep them
needing work. There are tax advantages for both parties, but
administration fees and restrictions on cashability are net negatives
compared to direct loans/deferred compensation. A pension system can
continue under natural financing and invest its assets back into QCSL
backed projects, but management may find employees willing to invest
more if they provide them with higher returning and more flexible
direct deferred compensation.
________________________________________________________________Bond holders do not in fact need to be bought out, with little risk to the corporation if further QCSLs can be issued to pay interest and principal.
The key to shareholders, is that it is management's duty (mandate of shareholder value maximization) to offer them conversion to natural finance. Or in my terms, since shareholders can be divided into powerful purpose-holding director determinators, and powerless benefit holders, it is purpose-holders duty to offer benefit-holders their benefits such that purpose remains ideal and unfettered. Minority shareholders have a common law right to remedies for their deceived powerlessness, and lack of purpose-holding benefits.
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